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DEPARTURE FROM PRECEDENT 
"'WITH the death of the reason for it, every legal doctrine 
dies.' * * * The fact that the reason for a given rule 
perished long ago is no just excuse for refusing now to declare the 
rule itself abrogated, but rather the greater justification for so 
declaring; and ·if no, reason ever existed, that fact furnishes addi-
tional justification. The doctrine of stare decisis does not preclude 
a departure from precedent established by a series of decisions 
clearly erroneous, unless property complications have resulted and 
a reversal would work a greater injury and injustice than would 
ensue by followipg the rule." 
This quotation is taken from Thurston v. Fritz, 91 Kan. 468, 
wherein the Supreme Court of Kansas, with but one dissenting 
voice out of seven, held that dying declarations are admissible in 
civil as well as in criminal cases. Furthermore, the court declared: 
"The rule admitting and the rule restricting [dying dec-
larations to criminal cases] are entirely court made, and 
when the reason for this restriction to cases of homicide 
ceases, if it ever existed, then such restriction should like-
wise cease." 
From these excerpts, it is submitted that the following is a fair 
deduction, or, perhaps, merely a restatement in slightly modified 
language: The Supreme Court of Kansas has gone on record as 
willing to overturn any common-law principle which, upon exam-
ination, proves to be based on reasons which are inadequate, or on 
no reason at all, except when property rights would be disturbed. 
For this purpose, it may be proper to classify common-law rules 
broadly into three classes, namely: (I) those which rest on sound 
reasons; (2) those which rest on inadequate reasons; and (3) 
those in reference ·to which reasons pro and con are about evenly 
balanced. 
As to those which rest on sound reasons, it would unquestionably 
be considered impertinent to cite an example. The law of torts, 
perhaps, comes as close as any branch of the law in resting on a 
firm foundation of reason. But though many common-law doc-
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trines have attained the ideal of the perfection of reason, it would 
be impossible for the most expert statistician and jurist to say j_ust 
wliat percentage of the sum total of common law principles has 
reached the pinnacle on which Coke and Blackstone seemed to per-
ceive the whole body of English law. 
As to the second class of rules, namely, those based on inade-
quate reasons, certainly any critical mind trained in the law will, 
on a moment's reflection, recall not a few, the number depending 
on the radical or conservative temperament of the individual. This 
second class may be subdivided into principles resting on reasons 
which have ceased to operate-in other words, reasons which have 
become obsolete, and'those which, while often supported apparently 
by a flood of reasons, will be found on closer inspection to be unsup-
ported by any reasons which can withstand the dry light of the 
logician. Instances of reasons which have ceased to function may 
be readily gathered in the field of the domestic relations, owing to 
the radical changes in the education and attitude of society towards 
married. women.1 
It is this second subdivision of the second class which presents 
the most interesting field for speculation. The limits of space for-
bid any exhaustive discussion of such cases about which, it must 
be admitted, plenty of room for differences of opinion exists. 
In only too many instances, however, the modern teacher of law 
finds himself confronted with the same perplexities as the teacher 
of geography in ancient days. The earth is flat and rests on a man's 
shoulders. The man stands on a turtle. "But, teacher, wbat does 
the turtle stand on?" There is nothing left to do but spank the 
inquisitive child tor his impertinence. A release of a debtor by 
the creditor does not release the surety, if the creditor expressly 
reserves his rights against the surety. Why? Because such a 
release is construed to be a limited covenant not to sue. What of 
it? Well, a limited covenant not to sue cannot be pleaded in bar 
of an action on the original obligation, but a release can be so 
plead~d. Why? We have now reached the realm of the imperti-
nent. Why do contracts not under seal require consideration? 
Why do not two reciprocal affers equal an offer and an acceptance? 
Why cannot the man who captures the burglar without having pre-
1 See Harrington v. Lowe, 7.3 Kan. r. 
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viously heard of the reward offered for such capture recover the 
reward? Is he not more praiseworthy than the sordid person who 
works solely for pay? Why do letters of acceptance alone ever 
take effect from the time they are mailed? How do they differ 
from letters containing offers or letters revoking offers? While I 
am not prepared to say that the answers which the common la\'• 
gives to the above questions are incorrect, might not a good argu-
ment be made today on the other side and with splendid reasons 
to back it? 
The cases just enumerated, like the effect of the release of a 
debtor with express reservation of the creditor's rights against the 
surety, wherein the rule of law may be found to be supported by 
inadequate reasons, should be distinguished from those doctrines 
which, wlu1e apparently supported by highly technical reasons, are 
really grounded on firm foundations which may not be evident on 
the surface. Thus, take the Rule in Shelley's Case. Possibly, in 
most cases, it has carried out the actual intention of the testator or 
grantor. When he said, "To A for life and remainder to his heirs," 
he may have intended a fee simple for A. The words "for life" 
and "remainder" are probably no less technical' verbiage to a lay 
mind than the word "heirs." So, also, take the highly fanciful 
maxim that an accord without satisfaction is void. If I agree with 
X that, if he paints my house, we will "call it square" on that hun-
dred dollars he promised to pay me· for a horse which I sold him, 
why should I not be permitted to sue him for the purchase price of 
the horse if he fails to paint my house? Does not the old maxim 
about an accord also carry out what was probably the understanding 
of the parties? Hence, in all cases, before rejecting a doctrine 
because it is apparently unsupported by reasons which satisfy us, 
is it not well to see if we 'Cannot discover a sounder reason than is 
generally given in support of the doctrine which we contemplate 
throwing into the discard? Doubtless, the old and fanciful reasons 
were often merely the mask or plumage of the more solid substance 
which lay underneath and which we must now take pains to uncover. 
The articles of legal antiquarians are often fascinating. Doubtless 
they are generally, if not always, written by persorls who first 
learned much of the law of their own day and then started to read 
legal history backwards. In such cases, the task of the writer is 
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often left incomplete, possibly from necessity. He carries us back 
one or two stages, and increases without satisfying our curiosity. 
The plot"' only thickens. He gives us the reasons for present rules, 
but the reasons which he succeeds in unearthing are o.ften as mys-
terious as the principle's themselves. Getting down to bed rock is 
often as difficult in legal history as in a city built on sand. The 
people of olden days had good thinking caps, but we cannot always 
get their point of view. 
The last class of rules which I have enumerated, namely, those 
in which the reasoµs pro and con are pretty evenly balanced, are 
not negligible. Where one of two innocent parties must suffer by 
the fraud of a third, one might think that the only fair and 
jµst thing to do many times is to split the difference and divide the 
loss. But the courts seem powerless to adopt the suggestion, except 
in rare cases, as in admiralty. What is the result, in such cases as 
that of the fraudulently issued bill of lading or of the negligent 
bank correspondent who lets the debtor escape? Sharp conflicts of 
authority and hosts of dissenting opinions, to say nothing of 5-to-4 
decisions. So, also, take the case of the anomalous endorser prior 
to the general enactment of the negotiable instrum·ents code. \Vhy 
were there not two, but a dozen lines of authority? Simply because 
there was about as much to be said for one position a.s anoth~r. 
In the light of the foregoing premises, is it not evident that, if all 
common law rules are to be reexamined·in the light of cold reason, 
a very considerable portion of our law hangs today in the balance? 
Furthermore, the question may be asked in all seriousness, not 
merely whether it is practicable or expedient, but whether it is even 
~ 
possible to cut loose from tradition and precedent and establish our 
law upon a basis whicp. shall be purely logical? Regardless of what 
may be the case in the field of pure mathematics, we certainly can-
not ignore the vast room for differences of opinion in the field of 
social relations. It may be illogical to exclude dying declarations 
in civil cases, but not in criminal cases. Well, wh~t of it? The 
following topic might furnish interesting material for a debate 
be~ween two groups of law students: Resolved, that the Supreme 
<;::ourts of the United States, and of each state, should adhei'e to 
the practice of the House of Lords in never reversing its judicial 
decisions. 
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If we are not prepa:-ed to accept the test of reason as to the 
basis of departure from precedent, but are, nevertheless, willing to 
allow the courts the privilege of reversing their decisions, upon 
what basis can such ·reversal ever be predicated? Here is my answer 
When it is quite clear to the court that the interests of society will 
be benefited considerably more than injured by departure from 
precedent, in such ·cases only is such a departure desirable. In 
other words, the test is social utility, not reason or logic. It is the 
pragmatic one, how will it work in society? Not, is it logical? 
It may be contended that these t\vo theories are the same; because 
social welfare will be best promoted by a logical code of law. Now 
I will confess that this raises two perplexing questions which I am 
not prepared to answer. Though, doubtless, in the course of ages, 
society will be best served by a strictly logical code of laws, who 
can tell us how soon the angel Gabriel expects to toot his norn on 
things terre5tial? If we have aeous yet ahead of us and are thor-
ough converts to the doctrine of mundane preparedness, then today 
seems to be the time to make the shift. But this leads us to .our 
second question, how much does the present generation owe to pos-
terity? Are we morally bound to cast ourselves at once on a sea 
of uncertainty for the sake of people of whom we shall even see but 
few, merely because they are going to be our descendants? 
Aside from the vague speculations in the previous paragraph on 
the question of the future of society, it is obvious that in many 
instances a precedent, no ma:tter how illogical and arbitrary, 
becomes, irt the course of time, like beauty, "its own excuse for 
being." It is not a case of following precedent for precedent's sake, 
but for society's sake. Members of the legal profession, to say 
no~ing of laymen learned in the law, become accustomed to settled 
principles and regulate their conduct accordingly. .And, in the 
opening words of Justice Benson, dissenting, in Thurston v. Fritz, 
"The rule that dying declarations are only admissible where the 
death of the declarant is the subject of the investigation is s.ettled 
as firmly in the jurisprudence of this state as any rule can be which 
is not established by constitution or statute." Probably no lawyer 
w0uld attempt to name any principle of the common law better 
settled than the one in question. Hence, it is submitted that such 
a principle should be overturned only when the good of society will 
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be promoted thereby, taking into account the fact_ that laws which 
are settled and certain are one of society's most priceless assets, 
and that even unfairness, as the old maxim goes, is, often at least, 
preferable to uncertainty. In the earlier days, when parliament 
met but rarely, and the calling of such meeting was little short of a 
mobilization of troops to engage in civil war, there was great reason 
for resort to fictions, equity, and the various back-door methods of 
changing the law. But today, with frequent sessions of the legis-
lature, is not the departure from judicial precedents less necessary? 
Moreover, the test of social utility is involved in the language of 
the majority of the court as quoted at the beginning of this article, 
namely, that the rule of stare decisis does not preclude a departure 
therefrom, "unless * * * a reversal would work a greater injury 
and injustice than would .ensue by following the rule." 
Perhaps it may be advisable to examine Thurston v. Fritz a little 
more closely. Stated in its very lowest terms, the facts and decisions 
were these: R conveyed a farm to F. F insisted that the purchase 
price agreed upon was much less than was claimed by T, who, as 
administrator of R, sued F to recover the purchase price. At the 
trial, counsel for the plaintiff offered in evidence a signed state-
ment made by R shortly before his death and signed in the presence 
of several witnesses. The action of the trial court in rejecting the 
document as evidence was held to be error by the Supreme Court. 
Justice Benson dissented, inter alid, on the ground that the mouth 
-of the survivor having been closed by statute, where the adverse 
party is the personal representative of the deceased person to the 
transaction, the c!ying declaration of the deceased should not be 
admitted, in the interest of equality. Justice Benson might also 
have mentioned the fact that depositions may be taken and intro-
duced by either side in a civil action, though only by the defense 
in criminal cases. 
The majority opinion is based primarily on criticisms of the rule 
excluding dying declarati.ons in civil cases by Professor Wigmore 
in his work on Evm:eNc~. The court also criticizes the prevailing 
rule as being "entirely court made," and gives preference to the 
authority of Professor Wigmore to earlier decisions of its own. 
Moreover, Professor Wigmore, in Section 1436 of his work, friti-
cizes the exclusion of dying declarations from civil cases as a "heresy 
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of the present [nineteenth] century which has not even the sanc-
tion of antiquity." Truly, a new day is dawning in American juris-
prudence if a rule of law is open to criticism because it is "entirely 
court made,'' if text writers, however learned, are to be followed 
instead of court decisions, and nineteenth century law i~ to be 
dubbed parvenu. We have been taught for ages that the glory of 
the common law is the fact that it is built, precedent upon prece-
dent, like the coral wreaths, or a brick house, and that the common 
law, unlike the Roman law, gives preference to precedent rather 
than the writings of jurists. As to nineteenth century precedents 
lacking the sanction of antiquity, I insist that I, too, know the stuff 
whereof after-dinner speeches at meetings of bar associations are 
made, about the ancient and venerable c;haracter of the common 
law. But take any collection of leading cases, or ca'Se-book, or list 
of ruling t:ases in almost any branch of the law, and subtract from 
it all decisions dated 18oo or later, and see how many you have left! 
I know that the germs of the present day principles can be found 
in the old cases, just as every acorn may contain, potentially, a giant 
oak. But it would be rather difficult to predict the exact dimen-
sions of the tree from the acorn ·before the tree actually grows. 
How much did Blackstone say or know about agency, partnerships, 
corporations, constitutional law, or even contracts as we understand 
those subjects. today? At all ·events, Th1lrston v. Fritz tends to 
raise the dignity and importance of the legal scholar, and perhaps, 
even on the test of social utility, time will vindicate its positi1;m. 
·The most that many a legal scholar has hoped for has been the 
making of an impression on law student.s, changes through legisla-
tion, the acceptance of his notions where the law is not clear or 
has not been passed upon by the courts. 1'o be able, in addition, 
to pull over some old pillars, Samson-l~e, is indeed an accomplish-
ment. 
H. w. HUMBI,E. 
University of Kansas. 
